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INTRODUCTION 
Following the accident which occurred at the "Three Mile Island" nuclear 
power plant in the US, the Commission of the EUropean Communities decided, 
as an initial measure, to send two officials to the US in order to obtain 
information on the spot. 
Several Member States and other countries had also thought it necessary 
to have representatives at the scene of the accident. As a result, 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United Kingdom were represented. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal organization responsible 
for nuclear safety, was anxious to make public as soon as possible 
information concerning the course of the accident. The Office of 
International Programmes, in particular, endeavoured to provide the 
foreign visitors with preliminary information as this became available • 
Briefing sessions arranged with NRO experts on specific.aspects of the 
accident made it ·possible to exchange opinions and clarify a number of 
points. 
On 5 April 1979, the NRC arranged a visit to the actual site during which 
Mr. Harold Denton, principal NRC official at the power station, gave an 
account in ~ddletown, the locality closest to the power plant, of the 
situation in the plant at that moment. 
The report on the accident and the associated events is based on the 
preliminary written and oral information supplied by the NRC and on the 
information contained in the "NURID" reports published by the NRC in 
respect -of the power plant in question. It was possible to consult these 
reports at the Public Document Room in Washington, DC • 
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In view of the ~r~liminar,y nature of the inforreation, the contents of 
this report should likewise be regarded as provisional. In particular, 
its conclusions should be reviewed in the light of the results of the 
detailed examination concerning the data of the accident. 
Independently of the analysis of the accident data by the NRC itself, 
an eleven-man commission has been set up by President Carter and will 
produce a report within six months. 
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THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION 
Generai Plant Description 
The Three Mile Island power station is situated in the south-eastern 
part of the state of Pennsylvania. The station is on an elongated 
island in the Susquehanna river, on the eastside. The closest community 
is Middletown at a distance of about 3 miles (5 km). The distance to 
Harrisburg is just over 10 miles (16 km)e 
The station is owned by Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central 
Power and Light Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company. All three 
owner companies are subsidiaries of General Public Utilities Corporation. 
The Three Mile Island power station consists of two generating units, 
both equipped with pressurized water reactors of Babcock and Wilcox 
design. Unit 1 has a net capacity of 792 MWe, Unit 2 a net capaoity 
of 880 MWe. 
The accident occurred in Unit 2, on 28 March 1979, while Unit 1 was shut-
down for yearly maintenance. 
The construction of TMI Unit 2 started more than 10 years ago. The 
reactor was made critical on 28 March 1978 and the unit started to 
deliver electricity to the network on 30 December 1978. 
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At about 4 .. 00 aom~ on 28 March 1979s ~ha ser.onCI.ary (non nuclear) 
cooling system of the Three Mile Island power station suffered a malfunction., 
This system normally pumps water through the plant's steam generators 
where the water turns to steam which then flows to turn a turbine 
generatoro The steam is th~n condensed back to water, which is pumped 
by a condenstate PQmp through a clean up system, through a feedwater 
pump, and finally back ·&o i.he steam generator, and flow continues 
around this loop. 
A malfunction in the main feedwater system caused the feedwater pump 
to cut out, which in turn caused the turbine generator to shutdown and 
stop generating electricity. Since the steam generators were not 
removing heat due to the stoppage of feedwater flow 9 the reactor coolant 
system pressure increased and. the pressurizer relief valve opened to 
reduce reactor pressure.. '!'he reactor shutdown automatically by the rapid e 
insertion of the plant's control rods as designed, and the nuclear chain 
reaction stopped leaving behind principally residual, o~ decay, heat. 
These events all oocurred within the first 30 seconds f~llowing the 
initial event. 
Up to this point, this sequence is normal given the initiating event and 
plant response was as expected, and the auxiliary feedwater system should 
start-up and deliver secondary coolant to the plant's two steam generators 
to remove heat. In addition, the pressurizer relief valve should close 
as reactor pressure decreases. 
All three of the auxiliary feedwater pumps are reported to have started 
but were unable to deliver flow because their flow paths were blocked 
by closed valves. Auxiliary feedwater flow was established through the 
opened ·valved about eight minutes later. In addition, the pressurizer 
relief valve failed to close and therefore allowed the reactor coolant 
system pressure to continue to decrease. 
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As the reactor pressure reached a preset value (112 kg/cm2), the 
plant's Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) started as designed and 
began to inject cold water into the reactor. At this point an indication 
of a rapidly rising pressurizer level apparently led the plant operators 
to terminate the ECCS flow. The Three Mile Island incident had been 
und.erway for 11-12 minutes. 
Between about 1 and 2 hours into the transient, the operators turned 
off the four large pumps which circulate the reactor coolant through 
the reactor. It is following this action that the severe damage to the 
nuclear fuel began. For the next several hours there was a ver,r large 
temperature difference across the reactor core indicating little flow 
of coolant through the core. 
It is thought that the high temperature in the reactor core led to 
swelling and bursting of a number of fuel tubes, causin~ the release 
of fission products to the primar.y coolant. This is also the period 
when the zirconium-water reaction producing hydrogen, must have taken 
place. The hydrogen collected in the top of the reactor vessel and 
this gas bubble caused problems in the circulation of the primar,r coolant. 
During this several hour period, when fuel damage was occurring, 
primar,y coolant from the reactor primar,r coolant system was being 
discharged to the reactor containment floor from flow out of the 
pressurizer relief valve and through the drain tank. Part of this 
coolant was automatically pumped from the reactor containment building 
floor to tanks in the auxiliar,y building. The tanks overflowed 
permitting radioactivity to be vented from the auxiliar,y building. 
This discharge was secured in about 40 minutes. The reactor containment 
was sealed (isolated) at about 9.00 a.m. 
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Through the afternoon and early evening of 28 March 1979, the licensee 
isolated the stuck open relief valve and tried to depressurize the 
reactor coolru1t system sufficiently to be able to turn on the residual 
heat removal system. Since his attempt failed, it was decided to 
repressurize the system. 
After repressurization (about 8.00 p.m.) one of the main reactor 
coolant pumps in loop A was restarted and flow through the reactor core 
was established. Heat was being transferred out of the reactor through 
the steam generator while using the condenser. The primary system was 
maintained at a pressure of approximately 70 kg/cm2 and a temperature 
0 
of 138 c. 
Reactor cooling has essentially been in this form since that time, 
while hydrogen from the primary coolant system was evacuated by 
degassing. This was brought about by transferring, gradually, the 
hydrogen to the pressurizer and venting it in a controlled manner to 
the containment. The other efforts have mainly been devoted to main-
taining this condition while a series of analyses have been conducted 
and while measurements have been taken to confirm a variety of 
parameters. These efforts have been directed towards preparing for the 
next steps in the cooldown process. 
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ACTIVITY RELEASED AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE 
Discharges to the atmosphere during the accident consisted essentially 
of radioactive noble gases although small amounts of iodine-131 and 
caesium-137 were also released. 
Liquid radioactive effluents were released, deliberately, into +.he 
Susquehanna River. These releases were probably within the limits 
cited in the Technical Speoifioations for the plant. 
US officials estimate the average individual dose in a 50 mile radius 
around the plant, received during the first week after the accident, to 
be 1.1 mrem. The maximum external whole body dose to a hypothetical 
individual staying permanently in the open air at the most exposed 
point accessible to the public would have been less than 100 mrem. For 
• comparison, the dose limit for a member of the population is 500 mrem 
per year and natural background is of the order of 100 mrem per year. 
• 
Analysis of air and milk samples showed iodine-131 to be present in a 
few oases and, in milk, traces of oaesium-137 were occasionally detected; 
the results for water, soil and vegetation were below the limit of 
detection. In all oases the peak concentrations present corresponded 
to potential doses of less than 5% of the annual dose limits. 
Up to 4 April, 3 members of the plant personnel received doses of about 
4 rem; other personnel 'received lower doses. The maximum permissible 
whole body dose for occupational exposure is 5 rem/year. 
From the above it appears that the radiation doses received as a result 
of the accident by the population living around the TMI plant and by 
plant pe"onnel cannot be considered as significant from the health 
point of view • 
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EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MEASURES 
The State of Pennsylvania has two organizations for emergency planning 
- The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), which has the 
task of implementing the protective measures for the population as 
decided by the Governor. 
- The Radiological Assessment Branch of the Environmental Resources 
Department, which recommends protective measures to the Governor. 
·" 
The PEMA has 4 oountr,r Emergency Operation Centers (EOC), of which one 
is in Harrisburg, to which it communicates the orders or recommendations 
of thE· Governor. The EOCs are responsible for alerting the population. 
The accident started on 28 March at 4.00 a.m. At 7.00 a.m. the licensee 
declared an internal site emergency; a general emergency was declared 
at 7.30 a.m. when a high level of radioactivity was detected in the 
containment building. However, since during the first days the dose 
readings around the plant remained low, no off-site intervention measures 
were taken. 
On Friday morning, 30 April at 8.40 a.m., venting of one of the radioactive 
waste gas decay tanks through the stack produced a radiation dose rate 
above the stack of 1.2 R/~ (later corrected to 0.6 R/hr). As a result 
of this, NRC, not having been informed by the licensee of his intention 
to vent the tanks and hence being unaware of the origin of the activity 
release, suggested to the Governor of Pennsylvania that pregnant women 
and pre-school children in an area of five miles around the plant should 
be evacuated. At noon the Governor gave this recommendation (not an order) 
to the population. The PEMA with the aid of the civil defense warned 
Middletown residents with sound trucks. (This was the only prot.ective 
measure taken by the Governor). However, ever,ybody treated it as an 
order. As a result of this, nearly the whole population of Middletown, 
3.5 miles from the plant, left the area; 23 schools were closed. During 
the weekend of 31 March - 1 April, as an explosion of the hydrogen bubble • 
in the reactor vessel of the T.MI plant was feared, plans were drawn 
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up to evacuate the entire region up to 25 miles around the site. 
Suoh an order was however never given. The authorities feared that 
an evacuation could cause an immense traffic jam; nevertheless, 
thousands of people (estimates range from 80,000 to 200,000) 
voluntarily left their homes during the course of the weekend. 
Problems enoountered during the Emergency 
Acoording to statements made by NRC offioials during briefings, the 
following problems were encountered 
-The State and local authorities were not sufficiently prepared for 
such an emergency. (In 1974 Metropolitan Eiison wrote to the 
Middletown borough officials that "••• even the worst possible accident 
postulated by the AEC would not require evacuation of the borough of 
Middletown ••• it can be seen that it is unnecessar,y to have speoific 
evacuation routes specified ••• "). 
- The recommendation for a selective evacuation endorsed by the 
Governor had unexpected consequences. Other people thought, 
"Why not me ?". As a result more than 50 % of the population in 
the 5-mile zone (25,000 people) left the area and in the 25 mile 
zone (650,000 people) at least 10 % (some say 30 %). 
-The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (H.E.W.) has fixed 
Protective Action Guides and has recommended the distribution of a 
thyroid blocking agent, potassium iodide (KI), to the population 
in case of radioactive iodine releases. At the time of the accident 
no KI was available (H.E.W. had just started contacting KI manufacturers). 
Two days after the accident 50,000 vials of KI (in liquid :form) were 
shipped to Middletown. However, as little· iodine was in practice 
discharged to the environment, no use was made of it. 
... ; ... 
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-The environmental monitoring was carried out by several organizations 
- State of Pennsylvania 
- Department of the Environment 
- Environmental Protection Agency 
- NRC 
During the first 3 days there were very long delays in obtaining 
monitoring results. Some samples were received several days 
after collection; many were received without reference to 
sampling location or time (both extremely important for deciding 
on protective measures). 
In the beginning there were many communication problems between 
the plant operator, NRC and the Government. Later permanent 
open telephone lines between the various organizations involved 
were installed, with servicemen from the telephone oompaQY 
permanently in attendance. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In a preliminary analysis the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 
identified the following six potential failures which have led to the 
core damage and activity releases in the TMI plant. 
1. At the time of the initiating event, loss of feedwater, both of the 
auxiliary feedwater trains were valved out of service. 
2. The pressurizer electromatic relief valve, which opened during 
the initial pressure surge, failed to close when the pressure 
decreased below the actuation level. 
3. Following rapid depressurization of the pressurizer, the pressurizer 
level indication may have lead to erroneous inferences of high level 
in the reactor coolant system. The pressurizer level indication 
apparently led the operators to prematurely terminate high pressure 
injection flow, even though substantial voids existed in the reactor 
coolant system. 
4. Because the containment does not isolate on high pressure injection 
(HP!) initiation, the highly radioactive water from the relief 
valve discharge was pumped out of the containment by the automatic 
initiation of a transfer pump. This water entered the radioactive 
waste treatment system in the auxiliary building where some of it 
overflowed to the floor. Out-gassing from this water and discharge 
through the auxiliary building ventilation system and filters was 
the principal source of the offsite release of radioactive noble 
gases. 
5· Subsequently, the high pressure injection system was intermittently 
operated attempting to control primary coolant inventory losses 
through the electromatic relief valve, apparently based on 
pressurizer level indication. Due to the presence of steam and/or 
non-condensible voids elsewhere in the reactor coolant system, this 
led to a further reduction in primary coolant inventoryo 
... ; ... 
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6. Tripping of reactor coolant pumps during the course of the transient, 
to protect against pump damage due to pump vibration, led to fuel 
damage since voids in the reactor coolant system prevented natural 
circulation. 
Following this analysis NRC has issued a list of actions to be taken 
by all licensees of operating light water reactors. This list of actions 
to be taken has also been transmitted to operators of light water 
reactors in EUrope. 
Of the six potential failures, one (1) is a human error, one (2) is 
purely mechanical failure and one (4) a design failure. Three (3) (5) (6) 
of the failures can be seen as combinations of mechanical failures and 
human errors. 
The most important failure, which is at the basis of the whole sequence -
of events, is that the auxiliar,y feedwater system of the steam generators 
was valved out. The operation of the reactor under these circumstances 
• 
• 
• 
is in flagrant violation of the NRC regulations laid down in the -· 
technical specifications of the plant (NUREG 0432-app. A Feb. 8/1978) 
which specify that : "Three independent steam generator emergency 
feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE ••••" 
Without this violation the accident would not have occurred. Furthermore, 
the question remains why action to open the valves was taken only 8 minutes 
later. 
The failure of the electromatic relief valve to close when the pressure 
decreased below the actuation level was a mechanical failure. There 
is no explanation yet for the fact that action to isolate this valve 
was only taken more than two hours after the start of the accident. 
The premature termination of the high pressure core cooling injection 
seems to result from an erroneous level reading. The question whether 
other instrument data. were available to the operators remains open. 
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On the basis of information available at the present time the 
erroneous level reading may be considered a mechanical failure. 
There may also be a design aspect related to this failure, as it 
remains unclear whether the level indicator was designed to work 
in the conditions of pressure variations and gas bubbles in the system 
as experienoed during the accident. 
At TMI the isolation of the containment building is initiated only 
by overpresaure in the oontainment building (0.28 kg/cm2) and this 
occurred only 5 hours after the beginning of the. accident. In other 
designs the reactor building is also isolated when the emergency core 
cooling system starts to operate. If this had been the case at TMI, 
no highly radioactive primary water would have been pumped into the 
auxiliary building. This is a design failure which diminished the 
efficiency of the containment to perform its function of limiting 
activity release. 
The intermittent operation of the emergency core cooling system was 
based on the reading of the level in the pressurizer. This probably 
erroneous reading is the one that lead to the premature termination 
of the high pressure injection and the comments that can be made 
concerning this failure are of the same nature as those related to the 
premature termination of the high pressure core cooling injection. 
The stopping of the primary coolant pumps was based on the knowledge that 
natural circulation would be sufficient to cool the shut-down reactor. 
However, the tests which demonstrated this natural circulation cooling 
did not simulate the low pressure conditions during the accident nor 
did they account for the possible presence of gas bubbles in the primary 
system. The plant operators probably did not realize this difference 
in conditions., 
In addition, the following preliminary comments can be made regarding 
the accident. They should be reviewed when more information becomes 
available. 
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Human Errors 
- The human errors that occurred show that more attention must be paid to 
1) the qualifications of Elant operators; the~r expertise should be 
such that deci~ions such as the blocking of an important system 
in violation of the technical specifications would never come up 
for consideration. 
2) the inspection of nuclear installations; a strict and constant 
control by an independent body is of prime importance. NRC had 
already permanent inspection on some nuclear installations. It 
is probable that the programme for the dispatching of resident 
inspectors will be accelerated. 
- At the outset of the accident and in the crucial hours that followed 
some difficult but important decisions had to be taken by the plant 
operator. Probably some of these were wrong. Therefore technical 
back-up teams which can be sent immediately to a plant in difficulty 
to assist the licensee in his decisions could be useful. 
Design Failures 
- Remote operation of the purge valves on the reactor vessel is not 
possible at TMI or any other light water reactor. The reason is that 
accidental opening of the valves could be the origin of a loss of 
coolant accident. This point should be re-examined in the light of 
the experience from the TMI accident. The remote operation of the 
purge valves could in this case have permitted the release of the 
hydrogen from the reactor vessel. 
Effluent monitoring in the stack through which the auxiliar,y building 
is vented seemed not to be working correctly. Since these detectors 
must give the ultimate information on the radiological risks for the 
... ; ... • 
• 
• 
'• 
• 
• 
- 15- COM(79) 238 
environment and on the emergency measures to be taken, they should 
be reliable under all circumstances. 
-The storage capacity of the liquid and gaseous waste collection 
tanks was much too small; during the accident ·they had to be 
emptied several times into the environment and new tanks had to be 
rushed to the site for liquid waste storage. Waste production during 
an accident should therefore be taken into account when designing 
the waste storage capacity. 
Emergency Response Planning 
The Pennsylvania State and local authorities were not sufficiently 
prepared to cope with an emergency of this kind. The accident has shown 
that particular attention must be given to emergency planning and 
preparedness, especially with regard to : 
- reference accidents for which emergency plans must be worked out, 
- setting of protective action levels, 
- specific responsibilities of participating organizations, 
- emergency equipment and personnel, 
- communication systems, 
- evacuation routes, reception centres, 
- distribution of thyroid blocking agents (KI), 
-environmental monitoring programmes and teams, 
- training of personnel involved in emergency interventionse 
:. 
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Radiological Consequences of the Accident 
According to the survey results, doses received by members of the 
public as a consequence of the accident are low compared with the dose 
limits. The environmental contamination has also been minimal. 
Occupational exposure up to 4 April was still within the annual limits. 
Therefore from a he~lth point of view the consequences of the accident 
can be considered as not significant. 
Safety EValuation 
The TMI accident has shown that the safety systems have performed their 
function of limiting the releases of radioactivity to the environment to 
acceptable levels. However, it is also clear that the safety evaluation 
studies concerning the pressurized water reactors have not yet fully 
covered all the possible major occurrences. This is in particular the 
case for hydrogen formation by the zirconium-water reaction and hydrogen 
accumulation in the top of the reactor vessel, causing cooling problems 
and risk of explosion. The safety evaluation of PWR reactors will need 
to be reviewed and extended with respect to these problems. 
Information 
The US public appears to be rather well informed about nuclear energy 
and its risks. In general the reaction of t·he public, even during the 
more critical phases of the accident cannot be considered excessive. 
In addition opinion polls have shown that the attitude towards nu.clear 
energy, which was rather positive, has not changed significantly as a 
result of the accident. 
During the course of the accident the US authorities, and more particularly 
NRC, have shown continuous concern to make public all information which 
became available. This is particularly well demonstrated by the telex 
information·whioh was made available by the US embassies. The NRC offioe 
of international programmes has also organized technical briefings and 
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meetings for the benefit of foreign technicians. 
This attitude of preparedness to share the available information is 
to be appreciated all the more in that NRC was particularly cautious 
with regard to the evaluation of what happened because of the far 
reaching implications any premature conclusions might have • 
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